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Why cognitive anthropology needs
to understand social interaction and
its mediation
I applaud Maurice Bloch’s insistence that in some non-trivial respect we are all talking
about the same world and his call for productive communications among the
disciplines. He’s at his most original, however, when he brings cognitive insights to
bear on our peculiar methodology: fieldwork is a process of individuals’ ‘mutual
colonisation’ (Bloch 2012: 183), something that builds on people’s ordinary capacities
for social interaction. Bloch’s defence of participant-observation against the
literal-minded interview should be required reading (along with Charles Briggs’s
thoroughgoing 1986 volume Learning How to Ask). That we ‘go in and out of one
another’ (p. 129) means communities cannot be treated atomistically, merely as popu-
lations or aggregations of individual minds.
Yet Bloch’s description of how we ‘go in and out of one another’ invites just that
treatment: ideas seem to pass directly from one neurosystem to another, bypassing all
those mediations that make the outcome distinctly historical. This omission stems from
an oddly provincial view of anthropology, confined to the putative heirs of Durkheim
and Boas, or to straw men who bear their names. Some readers will miss Morgan, Marx
and Weber, but what is most relevant to Bloch’s own concerns is that he ignores a
century of work in linguistic anthropology, microsociology, sociolinguistics and, in
fact, much psychology. He justly celebrates Malinowski’s early stab at pragmatics
but then the trail goes cold. His reading of linguistic anthropology stops in the 1930s
with Whorf and a disappointingly crude caricature of cultural constructionism. What
he calls ‘semiotics’ (sometimes ‘semiology’) is nothing of the sort, but just interpretive
anthropology. So what’s missing?
First, pragmatics: linguistic anthropology has long attacked the identification of
words with concepts, the treatment of language as a vehicle for propositions and the
reduction of semiosis to the coding and decoding of information. Indeed, semiosis is
not ‘messages passed between mindless machines’ (p. 178) and involves all the cognitive
processes Bloch mentions. But it is not just an open phone line between one cognitive
apparatus and another. Cognition is part of the story – but not the whole thing. Pace
Bloch, the object of anthropology cannot be simply ‘knowledge’.
Second, form: semiosis cannot be reduced to cognition in part because its
operations require some perceptible, hence material, form. What psychologists dub
‘Theory of Mind’ does not mean people are telepathic. The inferences you draw about
another’s thoughts or intentions are prompted by your perceptions of the formal
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properties of sounds, gestures, etc. Those properties are affected by a range of causal
factors, such as the mechanics of speech and the history of technology.
Third, the study of face-to-face interaction reveals patterns not reducible to what
happens within single minds. Individual reflexivity is inseparable from the self’s
interactions with others. Bloch points toward this, saying ‘social life is … built on this
continual imagination of the minds of others’ (p. 63). But what he does with this insight
is limited by his reliance on an epidemiological model that treats social life in terms of
populations. Lacking a real sociology, this mentalist approach makes it hard to account
for even rudimentary sociolinguistic effects like uneven transmission, unequal
knowledge, differential authority or the dynamics of affiliation and schizmogenesis.
More than imagination is at work. Studies of interaction, distributed cognition and
the circulation of texts challenge Bloch’s claim that meaning can only be found inside
individual minds. We have good empirical evidence that meaning is typically
co-produced and negotiated over the course of interaction. We see this in something
as banal as a friendly conversation that leads to a quarrel, surprising both participants.
Meaning takes place in time and space.
So, fourth, time and space: like most anthropologists, Bloch locates our human
distinctiveness in being creatures of history. But this history cannot be explained by
direct transmission of information from one neurosystem to another or, in his
metaphor for selves, from one ‘blob’ to another. How do the ‘public parts of blobs …
go in and out of each others bodies’ (pp. 128–9)? The missing link is semiotic
mediation. It is signs that connect one moment of time to others, circulate between
different contexts, and get reshaped and recombined in the process. It is signs, not
individual minds, which directly bear the marks of history.
Why does mediation matter? Bloch is right to observe that the knowledge that
informs what people do cannot be accessed directly (p. 171). But this isn’t just a
research problem; it’s something everyone faces when dealing with others. Therefore
we need to understand not only their inner cognitions, but also the mediation that
allows them to interact with one another. Semiotics is not just another widget. Nor is
it the vague fuzzy stuff that Bloch imagines it to be. It is the tough-minded work of
putting cognition (along with emotions and all the other bodily products of evolution)
into a material and social world that has a history.
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